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June 2020
ISSN 1653-8919
c© 2020 by Ruth Carlitz, Marina Povitkina. All rights reserved.
Environmental protection in authoritarian regimes: Investigating the role of pluralism
Ruth Carlitz
Marina Povitkina




When and how do authoritarian states secure environmental protection? Answering this
question is critical given that over half of the world’s population currently live in such
regimes. Furthermore, the majority of non-democracies are concentrated in the Global
South, which is also home to some of world’s greatest environmental challenges. Much
of what we know is informed by the case of China and understands environmental pro-
tection as a strategy for constructing and maintaining regime legitimacy. Much less is
known about why the degree of environmental protection varies within authoritarian set-
tings. This is a critical oversight since environmental issues are by their nature local.
As such, understanding when and how governments engage in environmental protection
requires studying the incentives facing local officials. We help fill this knowledge gap with
an empirical study of subnational variation in environmental protection in the author-
itarian regime of Vietnam. Studying a single country allows us to isolate key features
of political institutions while holding a number of other factors constant, strengthening
our ability to draw credible inferences. Specifically, we study the role of pluralism at the
local (district) level, and consider how the degree of pluralism relates to two key environ-
mental outcomes: air and water quality. While pluralism has the potential to promote
environmental protection by enhancing scrutiny of government actors, pluralism can also
undermine commitments to pro-environment policies, given their contentious nature. We
analyze data from Vietnam’s 208 districts and find that greater pluralism, measured by
the extent of civil society activity, electoral competition, and the degree of (corrupt) busi-
ness influence is associated with worse environmental outcomes. These finding call into
question received wisdom about the benefits of participation for sustainable development
and highlight the importance of developing contextually appropriate strategies.
Ruth Carlitz









The past decade has been characterized by exceptional global heat, retreating ice, and record
sea levels – largely as a consequence of human activities (IPCC, 2019). At the same time, rapid
industrialization in the Global South has led to unprecedented levels of air and water pollution
in many countries (GBD 2017 Risk Factor Collaborators, 2018). As a result, environmental
issues have become increasingly difficult for governments do ignore.
There is considerable variation in terms of how governments address environmental concerns;
however, scholars have begun to identify some patterns. One prominent strand of research
suggests that democracies tend to perform better when it comes to reducing human-induced
environmental degradation (Li and Reuveny, 2006) or improving air quality (Bernauer and
Koubi, 2009). Povitkina (2018) provides further evidence that democracies perform better when
it comes to curtailing air pollution, but only in contexts characterized by relatively low levels of
corruption.
Considerably less is known about the conditions under which authoritarian governments secure
environmental protection. Filling this knowledge gap is critical, given that over half of the
world’s population currently live in autocracies and that democratic backsliding threatens to
constrain the advantage enjoyed by citizens in many other countries (V-Dem Institute, 2020).
Furthermore, the majority of non-democracies are concentrated in the Global South, which is
also home to some of world’s greatest environmental challenges.
According to democratic theory, authoritarian governments should rarely if ever provide broadly
beneficial social benefits – with respect to environmental protection or otherwise. However, his-
torical experience and scholarly research suggest otherwise. In a number of stable authoritarian
settings, concerns with legitimacy have been argued to promote government action in the public
interest (Zhou and Ou-Yang, 2017; Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017). Emerging scholarship on
environmental protection in China takes a similar point of departure.1
We build on such work to consider subnational variation in one authoritarian regime: Viet-
nam. Environmental issues are by their nature local, since they affect where people live and
work. Thus, understanding when and how governments engage in environmental protection
requires studying the incentives facing local officials. Studying a single country also allows us
to isolate key features of political institutions while holding a number of other factors constant,
strengthening our ability to draw credible inferences.
Our study focuses on one factor that has been argued to affect the success of environmental
policies - the extent of pluralism. Pluralism has the potential to promote environmental pro-
tection by enhancing scrutiny of government actors and providing more channels to hold them
accountable. This logic is akin to arguments for democracies performing better when it comes to
environmental protection. However, pluralism can also undermine governments’ commitments to
environmental goals due to their contentious nature. Although there are widespread long-term
benefits to environmental protection, policies to achieve such goals are often seen as detrimental
to economic interests in the short term (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003). Therefore, in plu-
1See, e.g. Wang (2013); Ran (2013); Van Rooij (2006); Van Rooij and Lo (2010); Kostka (2016); Eaton and Kostka (2014).
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ralistic settings groups representing such interests can organize and undermine environmental
protection or avoid regulation – through both legal and corrupt means (Fredriksson, Vollebergh
and Dijkgraaf, 2004; Lopez and Mitra, 2000).
This paper investigates various forms of pluralism at the local (district) level, including civic
pluralism, electoral pluralism, and the (corrupt) influence of anti-environment business inter-
ests. We then consider how these different forms of pluralism relate to two key environmental
outcomes: air and water quality. Our empirical analysis is based on data from Vietnam’s 208
districts. While Vietnam is a one-party state, decentralization policies have been pursued along-
side economic liberalization beginning in the mid-1980s. Furthermore, seats for local office are
popularly contested and non-Party members are permitted to run. In addition, civil society
participation in Vietnam is on par with democracies at similar income levels. As a result, there
is considerable variation in the degree of pluralism across Vietnamese districts.
We show that districts characterized by higher levels of pluralism in its various forms also
tend to have lower air and water quality. This result is consistent across a range of model
specifications and estimation strategies. These findings imply that pluralism may be detrimental
to environmental protection in authoritarian settings and that even mobilization of actors who
would benefit from environmental protection (i.e., citizens), does not help contain air and water
pollution.
This study makes a number of important contributions. To our knowledge, it is the first to
systematically examine how pluralism relates to environmental protection at the local level.
Furthermore, we provide insights about the dynamics of environmental protection in an author-
itarian setting, adding an important perspective to a literature that to date has been dominated
by China. In addition, our findings call into question received wisdom about the benefits of
democratic institutions such as public participation for sustainable development. In so doing our
results highlight the danger of one-size-fits-all policies aimed at promoting “good governance.”
They also point to the importance of rooting out local corruption as a means of promoting
environmental protection and sustainable development.
This paper proceeds as follows. The following section presents our theoretical expectations
regarding the dynamics of environmental protection in authoritarian regimes. Then we describe
our empirical strategy and data, followed by results presentation and discussion.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN AUTOCRACIES
In order to understand the dynamics of environmental protection in authoritarian regimes,
we first consider the broader question of what motivates such governments to enact welfare-
enhancing policies at all. Such policies are frequently understood to be the exclusive purview of
democracies. The basic logic is that in democracies, electoral pressures motivate more spend-
ing in the public interest, and governments face more scrutiny if they fail to meet people’s
basic needs. To date, there have been a number of studies that look across countries to more
systematically investigate this proposition. On the whole, these studies suggest that countries
governed by democratic regimes tend to spend more and to provide more basic services than
their autocratic counterparts (Lieberman, 2015).
Furthermore, democracy has been argued to aid in solving both global and local environmental
problems, for a number of reasons. First, democratic institutions provide relevant fora for
increasing public awareness about environmental issues. Democracies are also more likely to have
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environmental issues on their political agenda than authoritarian regimes due to their openness
to a variety of interests. Finally, through free and fair elections, which are a necessary attribute
of democracy, citizens can hold politicians accountable for not delivering on their promises to
address environmental concerns (Povitkina, 2018). Leaders in non-democratic settings do not
face such incentives. However, as we discuss in further detail below, they are in some cases still
motivated to address environmental problems.
Environmental protection as authoritarian legitimation
The incentives that authoritarian regimes have to promote environmental protection relate to a
broader set of motivations grounded in the desire for legitimacy. In general, establishing some
form of legitimacy is understood as vital to the survival and durability of authoritarian rule
(Brady, 2009; Kailitz, 2013; Backes and Kailitz, 2015).
Authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule in a variety of ways. On the totalitarian end of
the spectrum, they rely primarily on indoctrination, employing political ideology, foundational
myths, and personal charisma as a means of consolidating and sustaining their rule (Von Soest
and Grauvogel, 2017). A larger number of stable authoritarian regimes have embraced some
form of procedural legitimation, adapting institutions like parties, parliaments, courts, and elec-
tions to facilitate power-sharing and co-opt potential opponents (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Gandhi
and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). There are distinct limits to procedural
legitimation, however, as allowing too much transparency or genuine competition in elections
increases the risks to autocrats of losing power.
Given the limits of ideological and procedural claims to legitimacy, scholars concur that most
durable authoritarian regimes legitimate their rule through socioeconomic performance (Dukalskis
and Gerschewski, 2017; Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017). Economic development has been seen
as fundamental to the creation of legitimacy and subsequent survival of military regimes in Latin
America (Epstein, 1984), as well as that of authoritarian rule in South Korea (Park, 1991), In-
donesia (Mietzner, 2018), and Vietnam (Hiep, 2012). Furthermore, the legitimacy conferred by
economic performance has served to shield authoritarian regimes such as Rwanda and China
from criticism about human rights abuses (Zhu, 2011; Straus and Waldorf, 2011; Friedman,
2012).
Beyond economic growth or public goods provision, scholars of authoritarian politics have begun
to consider responsiveness to environmental concerns as well. China is the most widely studied
case in this regard. For instance, Wang (2013) documents how Chinese bureaucrats began
to take substantial action on environmental protection and energy efficiency during China’s
11th five-year plan period (2006-2010) and argues that the use of environmental protection
represented a tool for delivering on the central components of performance legitimacy. Scholars
have also shown how poor air quality prompts mobilization around environmental issues in China
(Deng and Peng, 2018) and lowers political support for the Chinese regime (Alkon and Wang,
2018). Therefore, for the Chinese government, improving air quality has become a question of
re-establishing legitimacy (Engels, 2018).
Much less is known about the drivers of environmental protection within authoritarian regimes.
That is, why do some localities perform better or worse than others when it comes to limiting
air pollution or ensuring that water is safe for household use? In order to explain such variation,
we argue that the degree of pluralism is particularly important. We spell out the intuition for
this claim in what follows.
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Pluralism and Environmental Protection
At a basic level, we understand pluralism as the dispersion of power among influential political
actors. Pluralism takes various forms, reflecting the different ways in which diverse actors
are able to promote their interests. For example, pluralism manifests in electoral terms when
oppositional political organizations or candidates are able to participate in practice. Pluralism
can also be achieved when citizens can organize in groups to pursue their collective interests
and ideals – that is, through participation in civil society. Pluralism can also capture the
ability of particular interest groups, businesses, trade unions, or environmental non-governmental
organization advance their interests through lobbying or extra-legal means.
Pluralism can be helpful to ensure higher levels of scrutiny of governing actors, and more channels
to hold them accountable. Pluralism also increases the chances that welfare-promoting issues
will be in the interest of one of the key political actors and reach the political agenda. Such
arguments are akin to those presented above to explain why democracies tend to perform better
when it comes to promoting human welfare and development outcomes. However, an emerging
scholarship from less democratic settings suggests that pluralism can vary significantly within
countries, with important implications for local development. For instance, Cruz, Labonne and
Querubin (2020) show that social fractionalization (measured in terms of the number of distinct
clans) reduces the risk of elite capture and leads to increased public goods provision at the village
level in the Philippines. In a similar vein, Gisselquist, Leiderer and Nino-Zarazua (2016) show
that Zambian districts characterized by a greater degree of ethnic heterogeneity enjoy higher
levels of primary school enrollment and immunization rates, and have lower under-5 mortality
rates and fewer underweight children. Whereas much of the African Politics literature assumes a
negative relationship between ethnic diversity and development outcomes, Gisselquist, Leiderer
and Nino-Zarazua (2016) argue that in the context of neopatrimonialism, ethnic diversity can
serve to reduce local capture by motivating ethnic leaders to curtail capture by the followers of
their political (ethnic) opponents. Finally, Rosenberg, Kozlov and Libman (2018) consider how
local pluralism affects health outcomes within Russia. Here, pluralism is understood in terms of
the degree to which multiple groups of influential elites (with independent bases of economic and
political support) exist and compete for control of a given region. They show that higher levels
of pluralism are associated with better health outcomes – though only in rich regions.
While such examples speak to its beneficial influence, pluralism can also empower actors with
divergent interests and thus potentially undermine effective implementation or the very adoption
of certain policies – particularly those that are more contentious. Policies related to environmen-
tal protection are understood as particularly contentious, since government, industry, and the
population at large often have competing and incompatible interests – at least in the short term.
These trade-offs can be especially poignant for low-income countries, where economic develop-
ment is critical for improving livelihoods but environmental degradation represents an existential
threat for some communities (Nguyen and Pham, 2012). O’Rourke’s (2001) study of the Tan
Mai paper factory outside Ho Chi Minh City paints a vivid picture of a divided community that
both depends on the factory for income and is injured by its activities. Such trade-offs can also
manifest at the individual level. The 2018 PAPI survey included a conjoint survey experiment,
which showed that economic considerations such as job creation or the amount of tax revenues
an investment generate has a significant effect on respondents’ evaluation of a proposed project.
However, environmental considerations were shown to have an even stronger effect on people’s
evaluations of project attractiveness (CECODES, VFF-CRT, RTA & UNDP, 2018).
It is perhaps not surprising that pluralism has been shown to impede reaching environmental
goals. For example, Madden (2014) shows that OECD countries with more veto players (i.e.,
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federalism, bicameralism, presidentialism, the existence of referendums, judicial review, single-
member district electoral rules or pluralist form or interest-group representation) are significantly
less likely to adopt climate policies. Additionally, Scruggs (1999) finds that in pluralist systems
with competitive interest representation, where various interest groups stand on equal footing
when lobbying their interests to the governments, environmental performance is worse than
in corporatist societies. However, if the minority pro-environmental voices are included in the
decision-making, for example, if green parties take seats in the national parliaments, this benefits
countries’ control of air pollution (Mourao, 2019).
Turning to the influence of pluralism on environmental protection within countries, Stadelmann-
Steffen’s (2011) analysis of climate change policy in Switzerland is enlightening. This study sug-
gests that direct democracy makes it difficult to implement far-reaching climate change policies,
though it can produce more incremental changes supported by a broad political elite. Schwartz
(2004) argues that in China, devolving power to local authorities has been detrimental for en-
vironmental protection since local governments tend to focus on short-term economic growth.
Relatedly, Van Rooij (2006) argues that weak enforcement of environmental regulation reflects
conflicts of interest between national regulations and local stakeholders.
We expect that the presence of divergent interests can have an even stronger adverse influence on
environmental outcomes in countries with pervasive corruption, where pro-business interests can
bribe their way out of regulation, or influence political decision-making related the environment
through other corrupt means. In such contexts, political leaders have incentives to engage in
practices that bring private benefits from being in power in the short-term, but are detrimental
to the achievement of long-term goals for the benefit of the general of population, such as envi-
ronmental protection (Povitkina and Bolkvadze, 2019). For example, Eaton and Kostka (2014)
illustrate how short tenure cycles in China incentivize local cadres to prioritize short-term over
long-term gains, tolerating or even promoting corruption related to environmental regulation
while they benefit from bribes and kickbacks. The incentives to engage in corrupt behavior
frequently go beyond the desire for personal gain. For instance, Sundström’s (2015) study of
enforcement officials in South African fisheries illustrates the entrenched nature of environmen-
tal corruption. While local officials enjoy receiving bribes in return for lax enforcement, they
also have little incentive to report violations given corruption in the judiciary and at higher
levels of government. Furthermore, widespread corruption among officials has been shown to
negatively impact resource users’ compliance behavior when it comes to regulation of common
pool resources (Sundström, 2016).
In this study we take an exploratory approach and investigate the connection between pluralism
in its various manifestations and environmental outcomes (air and water quality) at the district
level in Vietnam. The next section outlines our empirical strategy.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
In order to minimize omitted variable bias, we limit our analysis to variation between sub-
national units within a single country rather than investigate variation across countries. As
such, it is more likely that the discovered associations between the variables can be attributed
to the effects proposed by our theoretical framework rather than to interference of other unob-
served factors excluded from the model. When choosing an appropriate context for the analysis,
we sought a country with non-negligible variation in sub-national levels of pluralism and en-
vironmental conditions. Second, we were guided by data availability. Keeping these factors
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in mind, we situate our study in Vietnam, an authoritarian regime where citizens have fairly
restricted political rights, but enjoy some degree of civil liberties (Freedom House, 2019). The
following section outlines relevant features of the Vietnam context in more detail.
Pluralism and Environmental Protection in Vietnam
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is a one-party state comprised of four formal struc-
tures: the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), the People’s Armed Forces, the state bureaucracy
(central and local government), and the Vietnam Fatherland Front (an umbrella group for mass
organizations) (Thayer, 2010). Following constitutional reforms in 1992, the unicameral, pop-
ularly elected National Assembly officially became the supreme organ of the government with
exclusive powers to pass laws and oversee government. In practice, however, the VCP is still seen
as playing these roles and thus the National Assembly has been understood as a rubber stamp
for decisions already decided upon by the government or the party. Furthermore, close observers
of Vietnamese politics hold that the central party-state leadership pre-plans the composition of
the National Assembly in a “paint-by-numbers” manner (Malesky and Schuler, 2009). For in-
stance, in the most recent (2016) National Assembly elections, VCP members won 96 percent
of seats despite fielding only 89 percent of all candidates2 (Malesky and Schuler, 2019).
Although power is centralized in terms of party politics, decentralization policies have been
pursued since the Doi Moi (“Renovation”) reforms begun in 1986.3 These reforms serve to
empower three additional tiers of government below the central government level.4 The pace of
decentralization has accelerated since the late 1990s, and local authorities have been granted in-
creasing fiscal autonomy since the adoption of the State Budget Law (SBL) of 2002. Subnational
government units are responsible for over half of total government spending; their contribution
has been important and increasing with respect to recurrent spending on education, health,
economic services, and public administration. Higher capacity local authorities tend to have
higher levels of spending responsibilities, though districts that have more people residing in
rural areas have devolved more responsibility to the district level (World Bank, 2015). When
it comes to water resources management, various functions have been decentralised: for exam-
ple, provincial and district authorities are responsible for service provision and infrastructure
maintenance (Waibel, 2010; UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, 2016). As a result,
there are considerable differences in the degree to which different localities effectively implement
environmental protection policies.
Moreover, Vietnam’s subnational units exhibit variation in effective pluralism. Vietnamese cit-
izens vote to elect their representatives in the legislative branch (the National Assembly at the
central level and People’s Councils at subnational levels), who in turn elect the leadership of the
executive branch and appoint the heads of the judiciary. Given that Vietnam is a single-party
regime, government institutions at every level are subordinate to the Communist Party. Candi-
dates for public office are therefore vetted by Party. However, seats are contested by multiple
2While other political parties are banned in Vietnam, independent candidates are allowed to compete.
3These reforms sought to replace the central planning model of socialism with a “market-oriented socialist economy under
state guidance” (Beresford, 2008: 221).
4First, the country is divided into 58 provinces; five centrally-controlled municipalities also exist at this level (Hanoi, Ho Chi
Minh City, Can Tho, Da Nang and Hai Phong.) Provinces and municipalities are subsequently divided into districts, provincial cities,
and district-level towns; these second-level administrative units are subsequently divided into communes, townships, and wards.
For the sake of readability, and reflecting the dominant administrative unit type at each level, we refer to all first-level administrative
units as provinces, all second-level units as districts, and all third-level units as communes. According to the May 2018 release
(3.6) of GADM, the Database of Global Administrative Areas, Vietnam currently has 678 districts and 10,805 communes.
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candidates and turnout is high, leading to considerable variation in the degree of competition
in local elections (Malesky, Nguyen and Tran, 2014).
Furthermore, though Vietnam’s one-party system inhibits electoral pluralism to a large extent,
civic participation is relatively high. Figure 1 shows that civil society participation is rated
significantly higher in Vietnam than in China, and has been on par with or even exceeded
participation in democratic India.
FIGURE 1. CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM, CHINA, AND INDIA
Although mass organizations (those affiliated with the VCP) dominate civil society, the Doi Moi
reforms have engendered greater diversity of civic life (Vu, 2017; Taylor et al., 2012). (Note the
jump in Vietnam’s civil society participation score after 1986 in Figure 1.) This has opened up
more space for more non-state actors to participate in policymaking (Larsen, 2011).
Vietnam’s emerging civil society has registered some important wins when it comes to environ-
mental protection, natural resource management, and increasing transparency (Vu, 2017; Taylor
et al., 2012; O’Rourke, 2001). However, some studies suggest that associational membership can
exert a negative impact on outcomes such as economic growth (Pink-Harper and Duong, 2017).
When it comes to environmental protection, Trang (2014) shows that the involvement of many
localities and various sectors constitute a challenge for managing water quality in the Dong
Nai River Basin. In addition, a number of CSOs report that it has been difficult to achieve
their objectives without relying on personal connections to government officials (Taylor et al.,
2012).
There are documented cases indicating that similar connections between private and state actors
hamper environmental protection. As To, Mahanty and Dressler’s (2014) ethnographic study
of timber trade in the lower Mekong reveals, lower-status traders engaged in illicit activities are
frequently protected by more powerful patrons within and outside state agencies, in exchange
for financial and other gifts. More generally, Suu (2007) identifies three major areas of business
influence through corrupt means in rural Vietnam: in land management and use, the construc-
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tion of infrastructure projects, and financial management. All three of these are understood to
facilitate water pollution as relates to the establishment of industrial zones, investment in water
treatment, and fee collection.
Data and methods
We leverage data primarily from the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration
Performance Index (PAPI).5 This survey covers all of Vietnam’s 63 provinces, and includes 208
districts, 414 communes, and 828 villages. Data is currently available for each year from 2011-
2018. Overall, PAPI surveys around 14,000 randomly selected Vietnamese citizens each year
with probability proportional to size sampling method.6 We use PAPI data to construct district-
level variables, taking the average for all responses in a given district.7
We analyze differences between districts using ordinary least squares regressions for the year
2018 with lagged values of the independent variables and with robust standard errors, to correct
for heteroskedastisity:
Yi = α+ β1Xi + εi (1)
where Y is predicted values of a dependent variable, i is a district, α is an intercept, X is a
vector of independent variables, with most of them taken for the year 2016, β1 is a vector of
coefficients for the independent variables, and ε is the error term.
Operationalizing Pluralism
This paper attempts to capture several aspects of pluralistic politics. First, we operationalize
pluralism through the degree of citizen participation in civic and political life. The measure of
civic engagement is a district-average of “yes” responses to the question, “Are you a member of
the Party, a Mass Organization, a professional association, cultural or social groups (for example,
dance club, opera, sports team)?” Figure 2 illustrates the range of groups of which respondents
to the 2018 PAPI reported being active members.
5PAPI survey is jointly conducted by the Center for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) and the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
6For more information on PAPI’s sampling strategy and methodology, see http://papi.org.vn/eng/faq and PAPI (2011).
7See Appendices B and E for further details on variable construction.
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FIGURE 2. TABULATION OF REPORTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP, 2018 PAPI
To capture how active citizens are in delivering their interests to the local officials, we also
introduce a variable measuring whether citizens have made a proposal to the local governments.
Survey respondents were presented with the statement, “Here are actions that people sometimes
take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of
these things during the past year.” and could reply yes or no on several actions, among which
is “Make a proposal or suggestion to the local authorities.” Our measure is a district-average of
“yes” replies to this question.
Second, we operationalize the (corrupt) influence of anti-environment business interests with
district-average agreement with the statement, “Companies in my district can avoid environ-
mental regulations by paying a bribe.” In the robustness checks, we also use an alternative
measure of corruptive business influence from the Provincial Competitiveness Index (Malesky,
2018); however, the data are only available for at the province level and do not allow for fine-
grained analysis.
Third, we examine how electoral competition, although rather limited given the one-party con-
text, relates to environmental outcomes. We measure electoral pluralism by the presence of non-
party members and self-nominated candidates in elections to commune/ward People’s Councils
in 2016 - the most recent election at this level captured by PAPI. We use the PAPI questions,
“Of the candidates for commune-level People’s Council members for selection, were there any
self-nominated candidates (self-nominated candidates are those who are not introduced by the
state to become candidates)?” and “Were any candidates non-Party members?” In 2016, ap-
proximately 8 percent of all respondents reported that there was a self-nominated candidate in
the local elections and 14 percent reported that there were non-party members in the elections.
The number of reported self-nominated candidates varies from 3 in Chau Thanh district to 37 in
Thanh Tri district, while the presence of non-party members in elections varies from 3 in Chau
Thanh district to 42 in Thanh Tri district.
There are a number of reasons potentially driving the motivation to run as a self-nominated
candidate. Interviews conducted in relation to the 2007 elections suggest that many such can-
didates are motivated to run in order to raise awareness about waste and corruption in major
infrastructure projects. Self-nominated candidates may perform this function through their ca-
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pacity to question officials during the two-month sessions where the full body is convened. Some
have also speculated that self-nominated candidates are motivated to run as a means of gaining
access to central government officials in order to further their business interests (Malesky and
Schuler, 2009). These diverse motivations speak to the potentially countervailing influence of
pluralism on the achievement of policy goals – i.e., improving monitoring and oversight on the
one hand, while potentially empowering veto players with interests that may run counter to the
public good on the other. Analysis of the 2016 National Assembly results suggest that non-Party
members tend to be less highly educated, hold less prestigious occupations, and occupy less high
profile/powerful positions in government institutions. Furthermore, a survey experiment con-
ducted in 2018 finds career is not correlated with party status in voters’ minds (Malesky and
Schuler, 2019). We expect similar dynamics to prevail at the local level when it comes to the
profile of non-party candidates.
Finally, in 2016, Vietnam for the first time published vote totals for the winning and losing can-
didates in its 2016 National Assembly election (Schuler, 2018). We calculate the last winner/first
loser ratio for each electoral district to as an alternative measure of electoral competition.
Operationalizing Environmental Protection
We measure environmental protection with two indicators: air and water quality. The SBL 2002
empowers local governments to play an influential role with respect to a number of functions
related to these and other contentious aspects of environmental protection.
The Vietnamese government’s expansion of export-oriented light industry, and limited capacity
for environmental regulation appear to tip the balance in favor of economic development at all
costs. At the same time, however, there is emerging evidence that local agencies do sometimes
respond to public complaints regarding environmental quality and regulate industrial pollution
(O’Rourke, 2002). As we argue above, addressing environmental concerns may also serve as a
strategy of regime legitimation.
Conflict over policies to improve air and water quality also reflects their inherent complexity.
Not only do urban traffic congestion and industrial pollution negatively impact air and water
quality, air quality is also influenced by ground level ozone (O3) and brick kiln emission (Nguyen,
2009), while water quality is influenced by the degree of land degradation, nutrients in soil and
the health of forests surrounding the waterways.
We measure air quality by using a perception-based indicator from PAPI. Respondents were
asked to rate air quality in their area on a 4-point scale, with higher values indicating better
air quality. To check whether people’s perceptions reflect the actual air quality, we attempt
to validate our measure with the objective air quality data from the World Air Quality Index
project. The objective data on air quality are available for seven stations in Vietnam in seven
different districts in different parts of the country. Therefore, air quality data collected from these
stations overall provide some idea of the regional differences, which we compare to those reflected
in the PAPI data. Table D.1 in Appendix D shows that differences in people’s perceptions of air
quality between districts approximately match the differences in the objective air quality across
the stations.
To measure water quality, we also use a perception-based indicator from PAPI. Respondents
were first asked whether there was a waterway near their house. In case of a positive reply, the
respondents were asked if the water in this waterway was clean enough to drink, swim or do
laundry in. Our measure of water quality is a district-average of “yes” replies to the question on
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whether the water quality in the nearby waterway is suitable for swimming. The distribution of
replies on both air and water quality per district are presented in Appendix E
Control Variables
We control for the relevant factors from the PAPI dataset that could potentially explain the
variation in air and water quality between the Vietnam districts, while also aiming for parsi-
moniousness. All models control for a measure of the district economic situation, measured by
the district-average response to the question, “As for your own family, how do you rate your
economic situation today?”
We also control for the extent of agriculture in each district, as we believe it can account for
several important factors. First, it can show how remote the district is from the urban areas,
which can affect the air and water quality. Second, more agricultural practices in a district can
mean higher air and water pollution. We measure the extent of agriculture per district using
a district-average response to a question from the PAPI survey on the main occupation of the
respondents and code all responses mentioning agriculture as a primary source of income as
1. The variable thus varies from 0 to 1 with higher values implying more people in a district
dependent on agriculture for their income.
We also incorporate data from two additional sources. First, we control for district population
using data from WorldPop, since population size can affect both air and water quality.8 We use
QGIS to match district shape files with the population grids, to extract district-level estimates
for population size for 2010 and 2015.
Second, we control for average night light brightness. Night lights are a frequent proxy for
economic development (Henderson, Storeygard and Weil, 2012), which affects the capacity to
invest in environmental protection. Night lights also reflect population density, and thus the
extent of emissions from fossil fuels used for electricity generation. Our data on night-time lights
comes from the United States Air Force Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Nighttime
Lights Time Series and are available yearly from 1992-2013. We incorporate district-level data
on average brightness of night-time lights for 2011-2013.
None of our selected variables correlate at a high level; therefore, we include them in the same
models. Details of the construction of all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table A.1
in the Appendix. Summary statistics and correlation between all variables used in the analysis
are presented in Appendix B. Distributions of observations across districts for all variables for
the years when they are included in the models are presented in Appendix C.
RESULTS
Figure 3 depicts Vietnam’s 208 districts ordered according to their levels of civic pluralism
measured by the average self-reported membership in civic and political organizations and their
air (left) and water (right) quality. The figure shows the slight negative association between
group membership and the two aspects of environmental protection.
8WorldPop uses census, survey, satellite, social media, cellphone and other spatial datasets to generate gridded population
maps, estimating population size for every 100x100m grid square. Gridded population data is available for Vietnam for 2010 and
2015. For more, see http://www.worldpop. org.uk/
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FIGURE 3. VIETNAM DISTRICTS POSITIONED ACCORDING TO THEIR LEVELS OF CIVIC
PLURALISM AND AIR/WATER QUALITY
In a similar manner, Figure 4 positions Vietnam districts according to their levels of electoral plu-
ralism measured by the presence of non-party members in commune elections, and the reported
air/water quality. The figure also shows a negative relationship between electoral pluralism and
the selected measures of environmental protection.
FIGURE 4. VIETNAM DISTRICTS POSITIONED ACCORDING TO THEIR LEVELS OF ELECTORAL
PLURALISM AND AIR/WATER QUALITY
Finally, Figure 5 shows that the (corrupt) influence of business interests is linearly and negatively
associated with air quality: districts with greater business influence on average tend to have lower
air and water quality, as perceived by the residents of these districts.
The trends in all three figures indicate a negative association between pluralism and environmen-
tal protection. While the associations between the variables do not appear very strong, districts
with higher pluralism do tend to perform worse on both environmental indicators.
We proceed by investigating these associations in a greater detail by controlling for the relevant
factors that might explain the variation in air and water quality between districts in a number
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FIGURE 5. VIETNAM DISTRICTS POSITIONED ACCORDING TO THEIR LEVELS OF BUSINESS
CORRUPTION IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR AND AIR/WATER QUALITY
of regressions. Table 1 shows the relationship between our different measures of civic pluralism
and air/water quality in Vietnam’s 208 districts. In Models 1, 2, 5 and 6, we operationalize
civic pluralism as group membership, while in Models 3, 4, 7 and 8, we use the average number
of citizen proposals to the local governments. Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 show bivariate relationships,
while Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 account for the influence of the control variables.
Models in Table 1 show that the association between civic pluralism and air/water quality is
negative and significant. Overall these results imply that districts with higher civic participa-
tion have lower air and water quality, which provides support for the “citizens as veto players”
hypothesis outlined in the theory section. Similarly, higher number of proposals to the govern-
ments is associated with lower water and air quality across districts, although the result for air
quality is only significant at 10 percent.
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TABLE 1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIC PLURALISM AND AIR/WATER QUALITY ACROSS
VIETNAM DISTRICTS
Air quality Water quality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Group memb. -0.085∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.213∗ -0.336∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.098) (0.094)
Gov. proposal -0.008 -0.111† -0.111 -0.514∗∗
(0.054) (0.065) (0.148) (0.154)
Econ. sit.(ln) 0.232∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.284∗ 0.303∗
(0.058) (0.061) (0.136) (0.141)
Agriculture -0.066∗ -0.074∗ -0.050 -0.055
(0.033) (0.034) (0.063) (0.064)
Night lights(ln) -0.016∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Pop. size(ln) -0.026∗ -0.022∗ -0.034† -0.028
(0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019)
Constant 0.719∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.545∗
(0.025) (0.124) (0.016) (0.130) (0.069) (0.211) (0.046) (0.219)
Observations 208 203 208 203 204 199 204 199
R-squared 0.020 0.145 0.000 0.115 0.026 0.187 0.003 0.182
Cross-district regression for the year 2018. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01,
∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All Independent variables are lagged 2 years. Night lights are for the year 2013. Population
size is for the year 2015. Abbreviations: memb. = membership; ln = natural logarithm; Econ.sit. = economic
situation; Pop. = population.
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Table 2 shows the relationship between our different measures of electoral pluralism and air/water
quality in the 208 Vietnam districts. We operationalize electoral pluralism in terms of the pres-
ence of non-party members in commune elections (in Models 1, 2, 5 and 6) and the presence of
self-nominated candidates (in Models 3, 4, 7 and 8). Similarly to the previous table, Models 1,
3, 5 and 7 show bivariate relationships, while Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 account for the effect of the
control variables. The association between electoral pluralism and air/water quality across dis-
tricts in Vietnam is again negative and significant in most models. Districts with more non-party
members competing in the commune elections have significantly lower air and water quality. The
same result for air quality also holds in models with self-nominated candidates as the measure
of electoral pluralism.
TABLE 2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTORAL PLURALISM AND AIR/WATER QUALITY
ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS
Air quality Water quality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Non-part memb. -0.085† -0.084† -0.235∗ -0.198†
(0.047) (0.045) (0.101) (0.101)
Self-nom. cand. -0.152∗∗ -0.141∗∗ 0.051 0.186
(0.053) (0.053) (0.138) (0.134)
Econ. sit.(ln) 0.202∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.210 0.204
(0.058) (0.059) (0.144) (0.147)
Agriculture -0.072∗ -0.101∗∗ -0.067 -0.062
(0.033) (0.034) (0.067) (0.068)
Night lights(ln) -0.014∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Pop. size(ln) -0.021∗ -0.016 -0.023 -0.024
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant 0.698∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.501∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.407†
(0.019) (0.132) (0.013) (0.126) (0.045) (0.230) (0.032) (0.231)
Observations 208 203 208 203 204 199 204 199
R-squared 0.017 0.119 0.034 0.129 0.028 0.148 0.001 0.139
Cross-district regression for the year 2018. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01,
∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All Independent variables are lagged 2 years. Night-time lights are for the year 2013. Popula-
tion size is for the year 2015. Abbreviations: Non-par. mem. = non-party members in elections to communes;
Self-nom. cand. = self-nominated candidates in elections to communes; Econ.sit = of economic situation in the
district; Pop.=population; ln = natural logarithm
Finally, Table 3 presents the results for the association between the influence of corruptive busi-
ness interests and air/water quality across the Vietnam districts as well as results for the tests
when all three measures of pluralism are included in the same model. Models 1 and 4 present
results from the bivariate regressions, Models 2 and 5 account for the control variables, and
Models 3 and 5 combine our main measures of civic and electoral pluralism (group member-
ship and non-party members competing in commune elections) with the measure of business
corruption against the environment, accounting for the relevant control variables. The results
show that districts where corruptive business interests are more influential have lower air and
water quality and this relationship is statistically significant across all models. Analyzing the
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findings presented in models 3 and 6, the corruptive influence of business interests seems to be
the strongest predictor of air and water quality across districts, compared to civic and electoral
pluralism. The previously discovered result for electoral pluralism loses its statistical power,
while the measure of civic pluralism (group membership) is still significant when it comes to
explaining variation in water quality.
TABLE 3. BUSINESS INTERESTS AND AIR/WATER QUALITY ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS
Air quality Water quality
1 2 3 4 5 6
Business influence -0.116∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.092∗ -0.323∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.036) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062)
Group membership -0.063 -0.168†
(0.044) (0.092)
Non-party members in elections -0.035 -0.075
(0.046) (0.096)
Economic situation (ln) 0.163∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.117 0.195
(0.056) (0.061) (0.129) (0.134)
Agriculture -0.107∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.150∗ -0.109
(0.033) (0.035) (0.063) (0.067)
Night lights (ln) -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Population size (ln) -0.020† -0.023∗ -0.019 -0.028
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.018)
Constant 0.734∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.124) (0.127) (0.043) (0.208) (0.206)
Observations 208 203 203 204 199 199
R-squared 0.075 0.175 0.186 0.121 0.221 0.237
Cross-district regression for the year 2018. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01,
∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All Independent variables are lagged 2 years. Night-time lights are for the year 2013. Population
size is for the year 2015. Abbreviations: ln = natural logarithm
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Robustness checks
To query the robustness of our results, we perform a number of additional tests. First, we use
alternative measures of the dependent variables: the perceived change in air and water quality.
We analyze district-average responses to the questions “How does the air quality compare with
three years ago?” and “How does the water quality compare with the three years ago?”. The
findings are presented in Table F.1-F.3 in Appendix F and similarly to the main models indicate
that all aspects of pluralism are associated with the perceptions of negative air and water quality
change across districts, with the results being even stronger than in the main models.
Second, we test for potential reverse causality. In principle, our results could indicate that peo-
ple in districts with poor air and water quality tend to organize more and thus are characterized
by more active memberships in civil society groups to attract attention to environmental pollu-
tion. To address these concerns, we estimate regressions with our measures of civic pluralism as
dependent variables and air and water quality as independent variables using the fixed effects
specification. This helps us estimate if the change in the air/water quality perception is associ-
ated with the change in the reported group memberships and the average number of proposals
made to local governments per district. The results, presented in Appendix K, are insignificant
implying that there is no association between the change in water/air quality and the change in
civic pluralism. This alleviates some concern about reverse causality.
Third, we analyze the proposed relationships between various aspects of pluralism and air/water
quality across Vietnam provinces (the administrative unit above the district), which allows us
to control for additional relevant factors for which data are unavailable at district level. These
include an alternative measure of business corruption from the Vietnam Provincial Competitive-
ness Index (Malesky, 2018), a measure of income per capita, the degree of industrial production,
and population density from the official Vietnam statistics (General Statistics Office of Viet Nam,
2019). In the province-level analysis, we similarly use the perceptions of air and water quality
as dependent variables but aggregate them up to the province level, instead of per district. The
results reflect those in the main analysis: provinces that exhibit a higher degree of pluralism
also tend to have lower air and water quality. We note that the results for water quality are
weaker; this could be explained by the aggregation of more water sources on the province level,
creating more noise in our analysis. Notably, the result for the alternative business corruption
indicator is also negative and significant, just as in the main analysis.
Fourth, we re-run our analyses using an alternative measure of electoral pluralism: competi-
tion in the 2016 National Assembly elections. The results are presented in Appendix H and
are insignificant, implying that it is more relevant to analyze the participation of alternative
candidates with possibly independent voices in local elections rather than the degree of compe-
tition between the candidates. This likely reflects the “paint-by-numbers” nature of electoral
competition in Vietnam noted above (Malesky and Schuler, 2009).
Fifth, we estimate a series of models that capture changes within districts over time. Here
our analysis is restricted to those indicators of pluralism that vary within districts according
to available data: civic pluralism and the corrupt influence of business interests. We lag all
independent variables two years assuming it takes some time before they exert an effect on
air and water quality. We also interpolate missing years for night lights and population size
assuming steady linear growth within districts. We estimate both fixed effects models and a
pooled time-series regression with panel corrected standard errors, lagged dependent variable
and Prais-Winston transformation to eliminate auto-correlation. As tables in Appendices I and J
show, we find significant results only in a pooled regression with panel corrected standard errors.
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The results, nevertheless, reflect those in the main models: higher pluralism is associated with
lower air and water quality.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis provides insight into the relationship between pluralism and environmental out-
comes in authoritarian regimes. We show that pluralism, whether it manifests through civil so-
ciety activity, electoral competition or business interference, is detrimental for such contentious
issues as air and water quality. The results are robust to alternative specifications and various
estimation strategies, being particularly strong in models that include business influence as a
measure of pluralism. These findings indicate that in contexts where business interests have
enough power to bribe public officials in order to avoid environmental regulations, air and water
quality may be particularly harmed.
We also find strong evidence that more civic group membership and more proposals to local
governments are related to lower air and water quality, suggesting that citizens can act as veto
players and promote their interests favoring economic growth at the expense of environmental
quality. However, it is difficult for us to eliminate the possibility of reverse causality, given data
availability. Given the exploratory nature of this analysis, we still find this result interesting.
It indicates that no matter what the nature of the civic group memberships are, and regardless
of the direction of the causality, civic pluralism may not benefit air and water quality in lower
income authoritarian settings.
Our findings thus offer an important nuance to previous research on the benefits of participation
and oversight for achieving environmental goals. The effects we find are rather small and we
expect this may be due to our focus on an authoritarian regime, where the meaning of pluralism
might differ from that in democracies. It is likely that civic groups as well as non-party members
and self-nominated candidates do not have as strong voice or influence on decision-making and
implementation as opposition parties and interest groups in democratic regimes. However, the
fact that we find an effect in an authoritarian setting where the level of pluralism is minimal
suggests that the role of pluralism in achieving various policy goals is worth investigating in
democracies, and that the results might even be stronger.
Finally, our study highlights the pernicious influence of corruption on environmental protection.
Whereas reforms to liberalize Vietnam’s economy have facilitated the country’s transition from
one of the world’s poorest countries to its current lower middle-income status, these same reforms
have also empowered business actors to further their interests – in some cases through corrupt
means (Gainsborough, 2003). This complicates the acknowledged tension between economic
development and environmental protection. Future research is needed to identify the most
effective means of resolving such tensions in order to achieve sustainable development.
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES
TABLE A.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES: DATA SOURCES AND CONSTRUCTION
Variable Source Method of construction
Air quality PAPI Average responses to the question: ”Could you please rate the
air quality in your area?” Responses are given on 4-point scale:
1 ”Poor”, 2 ”Poor on most days”, 3 ”Good on most days”, 4
”Good”. The measure is negatively skewed. We reverse it to
achieve positive skewness and then take an inverse.
Water quality PAPI Average of ”yes” responses to the binary question: ”Is the water
clean enough to swim”, which is a follow-up to the question ”Is
there a waterway near your house?”
Air quality
change
PAPI Average responses to the question “How does the air quality com-
pare with three years ago?”. Responses are given on a 3-point
scale: 1 ”worse”, 2 ”same”, 3 ”better”.
Water quality
change
PAPI Average responses to the question “How does the water quality
compare with the three years ago?”. Responses are given on a
3-point scale: 1 ”worse”, 2 ”same”, 3 ”better”.
Group
membership
PAPI Average of ”yes” responses to the binary question ”Are you a
member of the Party, a Mass Organization, a professional associ-
ation, cultural or social groups (for example, dance club, opera,
sports team)?”
Made a proposal PAPI Average of ”yes” responses to the binary question ”Here are ac-
tions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these,
please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these





PAPI Average of ”yes” responses to the binary question: ”Were any
candidates non-Party members?” as a follow up to the question
”Has election for Members of commune/ward People’s Council




PAPI Average of ”yes” responses to the binary question: ”Of the can-
didates for commune-level Peoples Council members for selection,
were there any self-nominated candidates (self-nominated candi-
dates are those who are not introduced by the state to become
candidates)?” as a follow up to the question ”Has election for




PAPI Average agreement with the statement ”Companies in my dis-
trict can avoid environmental regulations by paying a bribe.” The





PAPI Average response to the question: ”As for your own family, how do
you rate your economic situation today? Is it ...?”. The responses
are given on a 4-point scale: 4 ”very good”, 3 ”good”, 2 ”neither
good or bad”, 1 ”bad”, 0 ”very bad”. The variable is negatively
skewed. We reverse it to achieve the positive skewness, take the
natural logarithm, and then reverse it back for higher values to
mean better economic situation
Agriculture PAPI Average responses ”01 Agriculture” to the question ”In which sec-
tor is your current primary occupation [was your last job if re-
tired]?”
Education PAPI Average responses to the question: ”What is your highest level of




PCI Total percentage of responses ”agree” or ”totally agree” to the
statement ”Enterprises in my line of business usually have to pay
for informal charges”
Population size WorldPop District shape files matched with the gridded population data from
2010 and 2015. We fill in missing values assuming constant linear
population growth. We use a natural logarithm of the variable
due to its positive skewness
Night-time lights DMSP-
OLS
Average brightness of nighttime lights for 2011-2013. We fill in
missing values assuming constant linear growth within districts.







We calculated the measure of industrial production using yearly
growth data in per cent relative to the base year (2010) and the
data on the price of the gross industrial output in billion dong in
current prices in the base year. We use a natural logarithm of the













In thousand dong, at current prices. We use a natural logarithm





First loser-last winner ratio of the number of votes per candidate
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B SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS
TABLE B.1. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Air quality 208 3.46 0.26 2.39 3.87
Air quality (transformed) 208 0.66 0.10 0.38 0.89
Water quality 204 0.28 0.21 0.00 0.90
Member of political or civic group 208 0.65 0.16 0.19 0.95
Made a proposal to a local government 208 0.27 0.11 0.07 0.62
Business corruption 208 0.60 0.23 0.05 1.25
Non-party members in elections 208 0.40 0.15 0.00 0.86
Self-nomin. candidates in elections 208 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.65
Economic situation 208 2.00 0.15 1.23 2.30
Economic situation (transformed) 208 1.01 0.14 0.43 1.36
Agriculture 208 0.38 0.26 0.00 0.94
Night lights 203 16.52 18.09 0.00 63.00
Night lights (ln) 203 1.74 1.99 -4.33 4.14
Population size 203 141323.50 98306.05 7916.77 751977.10
Population size (transformed) 203 11.63 0.71 8.98 13.53
TABLE B.2. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES
Air Water Group Prop Corr Non Self- Eco Agric Lights Pop.
qual. qual. mem osal upt par nom sit
Air quality 1.00
Water quality 0.17 1.00
Group memb. -0.15 -0.16 1.00
Made a proposal -0.02 -0.06 0.66 1.00
Business corruption -0.28 -0.34 0.35 0.12 1.00
Non-party members -0.11 -0.15 0.27 0.26 0.20 1.00
Self-nomin. candid. -0.17 0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.10 0.12 1.00
Econ. sit.(ln) 0.13 -0.07 0.11 0.05 -0.02 0.12 -0.01 1.00
Agriculture -0.05 0.14 0.20 0.32 -0.24 0.09 -0.29 -0.33 1.00
Night lights (ln) -0.12 -0.33 -0.14 -0.36 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.48 -0.63 1.00
Pop. size (ln) -0.14 -0.19 -0.19 -0.23 0.06 -0.04 0.20 0.35 -0.33 0.41 1.00
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B.1 Average number of observations per district
The number of responses per district on each of the variables varies depending on the district
population and land area size. For example, in 2018, the number of respondents per district
varied from 56 in sparsely populated Tay Tra to 141 in highly populated Hoc Mon, as shown in
Figure B.1.
FIGURE B.1. NUMBER OF RESPONSES ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS
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C FREQUENCIES ACROSS DISTRICTS
FIGURE C.1. DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATIONS ON THE ORIGINAL VARIABLES ACROSS
DISTRICTS
Note: the frequencies for air and water quality are taken for the year 2018; for night-time lights - for the year
2013; population size - for the year 2015, and the rest of variables - for 2016.
28
D AIR QUALITY VALIDATION
Air quality index is available for seven stations in Vietnam located in different parts of the
country. The stations collect data for the concentration of PM2.5, PM10, SO2, NO2, O3 and
CO hourly. Historical data on the concentration of these pollutants are available daily, for
some stations since 2014, with large gaps. For more information about the index, please visit
https://aqicn.org/.
We checked the date when PAPI survey took place in each of the districts in 2018 and evaluated
the general trends in air quality measures during the closest months to the survey in 2018
or closest years available from the World Air Quality Index project. Historical records on air
quality also summarize the number of days per month, when the air quality was good, moderate,
unhealthy or hazardous. In Table D.1, we summarize our observation of trends for the months
closest to the PAPI survey in the respective districts and compare the air quality index data
with the district-average perception of air quality from PAPI survey.
TABLE D.1. AIR QUALITY VALIDATION
Station Month of Perception of Air quality
/district PAPI survey air quality (PAPI2018) index trends
Viet Tri July 3.28 good**
Hanoi October 2.83 unhealthy on most days
Ha Long October 3.49 good*
Ho Chi Min November 3.24 good-moderate on most days
Nha trang November 3.51 good*
Da Nang August 3.50 good*
Hue August 3.66 good**
Note: * - trends for respective months in 2019; ** - trends for respective months in 2015
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E RESPONSES ON AIR AND WATER QUALITY ACROSS
DISTRICTS
FIGURE E.1. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES ON AIR QUALITY PER DISTRICT
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FIGURE E.2. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES ON WATER QUALITY PER DISTRICT
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F ROBUSTNESS CHECKS. ALTERNATIVE DEPENDENT
VARIABLES
TABLE F.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIC PLURALISM AND PERCEPTIONS OF
AIR/WATER QUALITY CHANGE ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS
Change in air quality Change in water quality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Group memb. -0.329∗∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗ -0.749∗∗∗ -0.644∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.086) (0.138) (0.135)
Made a proposal -0.429∗∗∗ -0.651∗∗∗ -1.023∗∗∗ -0.855∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.133) (0.193) (0.211)
Econ. sit.(ln) 0.222† 0.257∗ -0.135 -0.128
(0.115) (0.115) (0.184) (0.183)
Agriculture -0.123 -0.127† -0.341∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.075) (0.092) (0.098)
Night lights (ln) -0.025∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.006 -0.019
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Pop. size (ln) -0.042† -0.036 0.024 0.037
(0.023) (0.022) (0.031) (0.034)
Constant 2.230∗∗∗ 2.614∗∗∗ 2.136∗∗∗ 2.459∗∗∗ 2.030∗∗∗ 1.961∗∗∗ 1.827∗∗∗ 1.649∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.275) (0.038) (0.263) (0.096) (0.336) (0.062) (0.350)
Observations 208 203 208 203 204 199 204 199
R-squared 0.064 0.119 0.050 0.131 0.146 0.221 0.125 0.191
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables are
lagged 2 years. Night lights are taken for the year 2013; population size is taken for the year 2015. Abbreviations:
memb. = membership; econ. sit. = economic situation; ln = natural logarithm; pop. = population
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TABLE F.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTORAL PLURALISM AND PERCEPTIONS OF
AIR/WATER QUALITY CHANGE ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS
Change in air quality Change in water quality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Non-part. mem. -0.344∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗
(0.093) (0.092) (0.128) (0.136)
Self-nom. cand. -0.180 -0.184 0.460∗ 0.168
(0.120) (0.127) (0.230) (0.212)
Econ. sit.(ln) 0.144 0.071 -0.275 -0.313†
(0.116) (0.122) (0.184) (0.188)
Agriculture -0.133† -0.193∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.080) (0.101) (0.101)
Night lights (ln) -0.020 -0.024† 0.001 -0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Pop. size (ln) -0.031 -0.020 0.045 0.047
(0.023) (0.024) (0.035) (0.033)
Constant 2.155∗∗∗ 2.433∗∗∗ 2.056∗∗∗ 2.322∗∗∗ 1.733∗∗∗ 1.595∗∗∗ 1.450∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.267) (0.028) (0.263) (0.054) (0.373) (0.047) (0.363)
Observations 208 203 208 203 204 199 204 199
R-squared 0.061 0.093 0.011 0.053 0.051 0.158 0.031 0.130
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables are
lagged 2 years. Night lights are taken for the year 2013; population size is taken for the year 2015. Abbreviations:
non-part. memb. = non-party members in commune elections; self-nomin. cand. = self-nominated candidates in
commune elections; econ. sit. = economic situation; ln = natural logarithm; pop. = population
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TABLE F.3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS INFLUENCE AND PERCEPTIONS OF
AIR/WATER QUALITY CHANGE ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS
Change in air quality Change in water quality
1 2 3 4 5 6
Business influence -0.336∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.132 -0.263∗ -0.056
(0.063) (0.064) (0.075) (0.110) (0.104) (0.111)
Group membership -0.154 -0.555∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.150)
Non-party members in elections -0.173† -0.223†
(0.090) (0.124)
Economic situation (ln) 0.016 0.109 -0.393∗ -0.138
(0.103) (0.112) (0.186) (0.183)
Agriculture -0.247∗∗∗ -0.194∗ -0.472∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.075) (0.095) (0.092)
Night lights (ln) -0.021† -0.020† -0.001 -0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Population size (ln) -0.024 -0.034 0.052 0.023
(0.021) (0.022) (0.033) (0.031)
Constant 2.220∗∗∗ 2.622∗∗∗ 2.748∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗∗ 1.680∗∗∗ 2.030∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.242) (0.254) (0.063) (0.362) (0.347)
Observations 208 203 203 204 199 199
R-squared 0.137 0.191 0.218 0.009 0.161 0.233
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables are
lagged 2 years. Night lights are taken for the year 2013; population size is taken for the year 2015. Abbreviations:
ln = natural logarithm
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G ROBUSTNESS CHECKS. PROVINCE-LEVEL ANALY-
SIS
In order to allow for alternative control variables, we conduct the analysis comparing Vietnam
provinces instead of districts, as there are more data available on the province-level. When
comparing provinces, we measure corruption using the data from Vietnam Provincial Competi-
tiveness Index on informal charges that businesses have to pay when conducting their operations
in different provinces in Vietnam (Malesky, 2018). The data are based on a large-scale survey
of business representatives in the entire country and our measure is a total percentage of affir-
mative responses with the statement “Enterprises in my line of business usually have to pay for
informal charges” by the survey respondents.
The measures of income per capita, the level of industrial production and population density
come from the National Statistics of Vietnam (2019). We calculated the measure of industrial
production using yearly growth data in per cent relative to the base year (2010), available from
the national statistics, and the data on the actual level of production levels in the base year.
The results are presented in Tables G.1 - G.3
TABLE G.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIC PLURALISM AND AIR/WATER QUALITY
ACROSS VIETNAM PROVINCES
Air quality Water quality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Group memb. -0.160∗ -0.172∗ -0.161 -0.229
(0.064) (0.066) (0.157) (0.150)
Made a proposal -0.125 -0.239∗ 0.071 -0.096
(0.086) (0.096) (0.228) (0.250)
Income/cap (ln) 0.050 0.047 -0.219∗ -0.208∗
(0.043) (0.045) (0.100) (0.100)
Agriculture -0.028 -0.030 -0.047 -0.097
(0.064) (0.064) (0.115) (0.131)
Ind. prod. (ln) -0.009 -0.006 0.011 0.013
(0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021)
Pop. dens. (ln) -0.033∗ -0.040∗ 0.011 0.004
(0.015) (0.016) (0.040) (0.039)
Constant 0.767∗∗∗ 0.667∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.659∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 2.007∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 1.842∗∗
(0.042) (0.281) (0.026) (0.281) (0.111) (0.656) (0.072) (0.657)
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
R-squared 0.102 0.273 0.023 0.230 0.022 0.126 0.002 0.090
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables are
lagged 2 years. Night lights are taken for the year 2013; population size is taken for the year 2015. Abbrevia-
tions: memb. = membership; income/cap = income per capita; ln = natural logarithm; ind. prod. = industrial
production; pop. dens. = population density
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TABLE G.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTORAL PLURALISM AND AIR/WATER QUALITY
ACROSS VIETNAM PROVINCES
Air quality Water quality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Non-part memb. -0.309∗∗ -0.269∗ -0.309 -0.277
(0.113) (0.116) (0.219) (0.218)
Self-nomin. cand. -0.187∗ -0.179∗ 0.398 0.452∗
(0.093) (0.083) (0.248) (0.193)
Income/cap (ln) 0.068 0.055 -0.196∗ -0.184†
(0.041) (0.042) (0.097) (0.101)
Agriculture -0.045 -0.105† -0.080 -0.060
(0.058) (0.055) (0.131) (0.127)
Ind. prod. (ln) -0.011 -0.005 0.009 0.006
(0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022)
Pop. dens. (ln) -0.031∗ -0.039∗ 0.012 0.005
(0.014) (0.016) (0.040) (0.037)
Constant 0.786∗∗∗ 0.535† 0.699∗∗∗ 0.572∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 1.819∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 1.578∗
(0.043) (0.279) (0.020) (0.254) (0.093) (0.600) (0.051) (0.629)
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
R-squared 0.129 0.263 0.041 0.206 0.028 0.108 0.039 0.134
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables are
lagged 2 years. Night lights are taken for the year 2013; population size is taken for the year 2015. Abbreviations:
non-part. memb. = non-party members in commune elections; self-nomin. cand. = self-nominated candidates in
commune elections; income/cap = income per capita; ln = natural logarithm; ind. prod. = industrial production;
pop. dens. = population density
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TABLE G.3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS CORRUPTION AND AIR/WATER QUALITY
ACROSS VIETNAM PROVINCES
Air quality Water quality
1 2 3 4 5 6
Business corruption -0.158∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.359∗∗ -0.345∗∗ -0.366∗∗
(0.043) (0.040) (0.048) (0.111) (0.118) (0.132)
Group membership -0.035 0.052
(0.072) (0.152)
Non-party members in elections -0.128 0.000
(0.106) (0.244)
Income per capita (ln) 0.079∗ 0.076† -0.167† -0.161
(0.038) (0.039) (0.096) (0.100)
Agriculture -0.102† -0.069 -0.160 -0.178
(0.052) (0.061) (0.114) (0.125)
Industrial production (ln) -0.007 -0.009 0.013 0.014
(0.009) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019)
Population density (ln) -0.043∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.005 -0.007
(0.014) (0.013) (0.034) (0.036)
Constant 0.756∗∗∗ 0.489∗ 0.546∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 1.767∗∗ 1.714∗∗
(0.024) (0.240) (0.266) (0.073) (0.580) (0.627)
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63
R-squared 0.173 0.362 0.387 0.190 0.258 0.260
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables are
lagged 2 years. Night lights are taken for the year 2013; population size is taken for the year 2015. Abbreviations:
ln = natural logarithm
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H ROBUSTNESS CHECKS. ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF
ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS
We calculate the measure of electoral competitiveness using the publicly available data on vote
numbers for all winning and losing candidates in the Vietnam latest elections in 2016, available
from the Vietnam National Election Council. We calculate the first-loser-to-last-winner ratio in
order to capture how much division there was among the electorate when choosing their repre-
sentatives to the government. The data are available for electoral districts, which include several
administrative districts. We imputed the data for districts according to which electoral district
they belonged to. This means that administrative districts belonging to the same electoral
district have similar competitiveness values.
TABLE H.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTORAL COMPETITVENESS INDEX AND
AIR/WATER QUALITY ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS
Air quality Water quality
1 2 3 4
Competitiveness 0.007 0.026 0.019 0.110†
(0.029) (0.029) (0.062) (0.059)




Night-time light (ln) -0.016∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009)
Population size (ln) -0.021∗ -0.024
(0.010) (0.020)
Constant 0.660∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.425†
(0.019) (0.127) (0.038) (0.231)
Observations 208 203 204 199
R-squared 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.144
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All inde-
pendent variables are lagged 2 years. Night lights are taken for the year 2013; population size
is taken for the year 2015. Abbreviations: ln = natural logarithm
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I ROBUSTNESS CHECKS. FIXED EFFECTS
We also check whether the relationships we found in the cross-sectional analysis, manifest them-
selves in the analysis of short-term changes within districts. We perform the analysis over
2011-2018 keeping the differences between the districts constant using a fixed-effects specifica-
tion:
Yit = αi + β1Xit−2 + εit (2)
where t is a year and αi is an unobserved time-invariant individual effect (fixed effect) or a
separate intercept for each district. Tables I.1 and I.2 present the results.
TABLE I.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIC PLURALISM/BUSINESS INFLUENCE AND AIR
QUALITY ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS. FIXED EFFECTS MODELS
Model Model Model Model Model
DV: air quality 1 2 3 4 5
Group membership -0.014 -0.031† -0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.043)
Business influence 0.003 0.007 0.007
(0.027) (0.030) (0.031)
Economic situation (ln) 0.018 0.040 0.040
(0.031) (0.047) (0.047)
Agriculture 0.006 0.041 0.042
(0.035) (0.061) (0.061)
Night-time light (ln) 0.008 0.015 0.015
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Population size (ln) -1.048∗∗ -0.696 -0.696
(0.336) (0.659) (0.661)
Constant 0.675∗∗∗ 12.835∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 8.681 8.677
(0.010) (3.913) (0.016) (7.674) (7.689)
Observations 618 603 416 406 406
R-squared 0.002 0.024 0.000 0.011 0.011
Number of districts 208 203 208 203 203
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables are
lagged 2 years. Business influence is lagged 1 year due to data availability. Abbreviations: ln = natural logarithm
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TABLE I.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIC PLURALISM/BUSINESS INFLUENCE AND
WATER QUALITY ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS. FIXED EFFECTS MODELS
Model Model Model Model Model
DV: water quality 1 2 3 4 5
Group membership -0.012 -0.003 -0.067
(0.027) (0.031) (0.077)
Business influence 0.062 0.094 0.099
(0.056) (0.060) (0.060)
Economic situation (ln) 0.006 0.060 0.074
(0.059) (0.072) (0.075)
Agriculture -0.047 0.153† 0.160†
(0.085) (0.091) (0.092)
Night-time light (ln) -0.011 0.028† 0.030†
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Population size (ln) 1.008 1.942 1.992
(0.828) (1.530) (1.547)
Constant 0.277∗∗∗ -11.410 0.237∗∗∗ -22.514 -23.075
(0.019) (9.612) (0.032) (17.772) (17.973)
Observations 604 589 407 397 397
R-squared 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.038 0.041
Number of districts 204 199 204 199 199
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables are
lagged 2 years. Business influence is lagged 1 year due to data availability. Abbreviations: ln = natural logarithm
40
J ROBUSTNESS CHECKS. PANEL-CORRECTED STAN-
DARD ERRORS
We also perform the over-time analysis for the pooled sample using panel-corrected standard
errors (Beck and Katz, 1995) with Prais-Winston transformation (Tables J.1 and J.2) and lagged
dependent variable included in the list of the predictors (Tables J.3 and J.4) to correct for first-
order auto-correlation.
TABLE J.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIC PLURALISM/BUSINESS INFLUENCE AND AIR
QUALITY ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS. PANEL-CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS WITH
PRAIS-WINSTEN TRANSFORMATION
Model Model Model Model Model
DV: air quality 1 2 3 4 5
Group membership -0.078∗∗ -0.096∗ -0.095†
(0.028) (0.038) (0.052)
Business influence -0.151∗∗ -0.165∗∗ -0.132∗
(0.056) (0.061) (0.054)
Economic situation (ln) 0.106∗∗ 0.069† 0.106∗
(0.034) (0.041) (0.042)
Agriculture -0.070∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.021)
Night-time light (ln) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Population size (ln) -0.014∗ -0.015∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Constant 0.719∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.049) (0.034) (0.027) (0.026)
Observations 618 603 416 406 406
R-squared 0.644 0.638 0.538 0.452 0.521
Number of district 208 203 208 203 203
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables
are lagged 2 years. Business influence is lagged 1 year due to data availability. Abbreviations: ln = natural
logarithm
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TABLE J.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIC PLURALISM/BUSINESS INFLUENCE AND
WATER QUALITY ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS. PANEL-CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS
WITH PRAIS-WINSTEN TRANSFORMATION
Model Model Model Model Model
DV: water quality 1 2 3 4 5
Group membership -0.054† -0.081† -0.195∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.047) (0.034)
Business influence -0.212† -0.183† -0.131†
(0.111) (0.100) (0.079)
Economic situation (ln) 0.027 -0.021 0.055
(0.051) (0.069) (0.063)
Agriculture -0.010 -0.032 -0.009
(0.023) (0.033) (0.025)
Night-time light (ln) -0.031∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Population size (ln) -0.020∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Constant 0.307∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.053) (0.064) (0.110) (0.098)
Observations 604 589 407 397 397
R-squared 0.082 0.158 0.103 0.180 0.195
Number of district 204 199 204 199 199
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables
are lagged 2 years. Business influence is lagged 1 year due to data availability. Abbreviations: ln = natural
logarithm
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TABLE J.3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIC PLURALISM/BUSINESS INFLUENCE AND AIR
QUALITY ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS. PANEL-CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS WITH
PRAIS-WINSTEN TRANSFORMATION AND LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Model Model Model Model Model
DV: air quality 1 2 3 4 5
Group membership -0.001 -0.017 0.002
(0.041) (0.052) (0.048)
Business influence -0.044∗ -0.043 -0.043∗∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.014)
Economic situation (ln) 0.024 0.015 0.015
(0.048) (0.045) (0.048)
Agriculture -0.009 -0.021 -0.021
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015)
Night-time light (ln) -0.003 -0.003† -0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Population size (ln) -0.009† -0.009† -0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
LDV 0.728∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.182) (0.183) (0.189) (0.197)
Constant 0.182 0.290† 0.242† 0.346∗ 0.345†
(0.128) (0.164) (0.129) (0.155) (0.181)
Observations 416 406 416 406 406
R-squared 0.604 0.648 0.560 0.592 0.592
Number of district 208 203 208 203 203
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables
are lagged 2 years. Business influence is lagged 1 year due to data availability. Abbreviations: ln = natural
logarithm
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TABLE J.4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIC PLURALISM/BUSINESS INFLUENCE AND
WATER QUALITY ACROSS VIETNAM DISTRICTS. PANEL-CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS
WITH PRAIS-WINSTEN TRANSFORMATION AND LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Model Model Model Model Model
DV: water quality 1 2 3 4 5
Group membership -0.049 -0.103∗ -0.092∗
(0.045) (0.049) (0.042)
Business influence -0.050 -0.046 -0.018
(0.037) (0.037) (0.032)
Economic situation (ln) 0.073∗∗∗ 0.025 0.065∗
(0.013) (0.030) (0.025)
Agriculture -0.020 -0.035∗ -0.023
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Night-time light (ln) -0.009∗ -0.008∗ -0.009∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Population size (ln) -0.014 -0.010 -0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
LDV 0.810∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.158) (0.149) (0.158) (0.165)
Constant 0.088 0.246∗ 0.088 0.204 0.259†
(0.068) (0.125) (0.060) (0.127) (0.135)
Observations 406 396 406 396 396
R-squared 0.652 0.661 0.654 0.660 0.655
Number of district 203 198 203 198 198
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. All independent variables
are lagged 2 years. Business influence is lagged 1 year due to data availability. Abbreviations: ln = natural
logarithm
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K ROBUSTNESS CHECKS. REVERSE CAUSALITY
TABLE K.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR/WATER QUALITY AND CIVIC PLURALISM. FIXED
EFFECTS MODELS
Group membership Made a proposal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Air quality -0.026 -0.038 -0.074 -0.087†
(0.072) (0.072) (0.050) (0.049)
Water quality -0.015 -0.008 -0.004 0.003
(0.034) (0.036) (0.027) (0.025)
Education 0.043∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011)
Econ. sit. (ln) 0.154∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Agriculture 0.098 0.172∗ 0.098 0.171† 0.093† 0.168∗∗ 0.098† 0.175∗∗
(0.083) (0.086) (0.083) (0.088) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.054)
Night lights (ln) -0.014† -0.018∗ -0.014† -0.017∗ 0.014∗ 0.010† 0.014∗ 0.010†
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Pop. size (ln) 0.453 0.422 0.566 0.511 -0.728∗ -0.759∗ -0.597† -0.655∗
(0.422) (0.428) (0.442) (0.455) (0.323) (0.310) (0.337) (0.323)
Constant -4.761 -4.621 -6.074 -5.657 8.570∗ 8.713∗ 6.993† 7.435∗
(4.908) (4.969) (5.125) (5.259) (3.757) (3.601) (3.909) (3.736)
Observations 609 609 595 595 609 609 595 595
R-squared 0.042 0.060 0.044 0.060 0.069 0.103 0.067 0.101
Number of district 203 203 199 199 203 203 199 199
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. Abbreviations: econ. sit. =
economic situation; ln = natural logarithm; pop. = population
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TABLE K.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHANGE IN AIR/WATER
QUALITY AND CIVIC PLURALISM. FIXED EFFECTS MODELS
Group membership Made a proposal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Air qual. change 0.014 0.026 0.027 0.040†
(0.031) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024)
Water qual. change -0.014 -0.011 -0.008 -0.005
(0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Education 0.045∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011)
Econ. sit. (ln) 0.151∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Agriculture 0.099 0.175∗ 0.101 0.173∗ 0.098† 0.175∗∗ 0.100† 0.175∗∗
(0.082) (0.085) (0.082) (0.086) (0.050) (0.053) (0.051) (0.054)
Night lights (ln) -0.013 -0.016† -0.014† -0.017∗ 0.016∗ 0.012∗ 0.014∗ 0.010†
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Pop. size (ln) 0.486 0.472 0.591 0.536 -0.637∗ -0.651∗ -0.578† -0.637∗
(0.417) (0.421) (0.450) (0.459) (0.308) (0.295) (0.331) (0.320)
Constant -5.185 -5.286 -6.346 -5.925 7.413∗ 7.309∗ 6.782† 7.230†
(4.829) (4.865) (5.206) (5.301) (3.583) (3.427) (3.836) (3.704)
Observations 609 609 595 595 609 609 595 595
R-squared 0.042 0.061 0.045 0.061 0.067 0.103 0.068 0.101
Number of district 203 203 199 199 203 203 199 199
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. Abbreviations: qual. = quality;
econ. sit. = economic situation; ln = natural logarithm; pop. = population
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